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Relative to most other European countries the United Kingdom enjoys a secure, positive 
memory of World War 2. At its simplest, the narrative goes: the Germans started it and 
the British, with their allies, won. However damaging to British relations with other 
European states since 1945, this account has proved remarkably durable.1 Not for the 
British the ‘divided memory’ of Italy2 or the Vichy syndrome of France3 or the 
‘historians’ dispute’ of Germany; Britain’s dominant memories of World War 2 are 
unified, straightforward, and patriotic. 
 
Within this serene landscape, the combined bombing offensive against Germany, and 
specifically the part played by Bomber Command of the Royal Air Force (RAF), form an 
exception. Memories of Bomber Command are unusual in being both complex and 
volatile. They are complex because they concern inherently difficult questions – the 
effectiveness and the morality of strategic bombing in World War 2 – and because they 
have involved different ‘levels’ of memory –the official, the academic, the popular, the 
local – rather differently. A cohesive national myth of the bombing campaign, comparable 
(for example) to the British myth of the Blitz, the German bombing of British cities in 
1940-1941,4 is impossible. Memories of the bombing offensive, moreover, are volatile 
because they have shown significant variance over time. 
 
                                                 
1  John Ramsden, ‘Myths and Realities of the “People’s War”, in Britain’, in Jörg Echternkamp and Stefan Martens 
(eds.), Experience and Memory: the Second World War in Europe (Oxford: Berghahn, 2010), pp. 40-52. 
2  John Foot, Italy’s Divided Memory (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2009). 
3  Henry Rousso, The Vichy Syndrome. History and Memory in France since 1944, tr. Arthur Goldhammer 
(Cambridge, Ma. and London: Harvard University Press, 1991); see also Olivier Wieviorka, Divided Memory: 
French Recollections of World War II from the Liberation to the Present, tr. George Holoch (Stanford, Ca: 
Stanford University Press, 2012);  
4  Angus Calder, The Myth of the Blitz (London: Jonathan Cape, 1991). 
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The nature of the offensive can be summarised in two sets of figures. First, approximately 
125,000 men served as Bomber Command aircrew, 69.2 per cent of them British, the rest 
from Commonwealth or occupied European countries. Of these, 47,305 were killed in 
action or died while prisoners of war; a further 8,195 were killed in accidents; 8,403 
returned home wounded; and 9,838, many of them also wounded, became prisoners of 
war. Thus 59 per cent of all who served became casualties, including 47 per cent killed.5 
As some of the most highly-trained men in the armed services, aircrew were well placed 
to know their chances; but all were volunteers.  
 
More troubling, secondly, are the casualties that Bomber Command inflicted. The Allies 
dropped some 2.5 million tonnes of bombs on continental Europe, dwarfing the 75,000 
tons dropped on the United Kingdom by the Luftwaffe. Just over half the total was aimed 
at Germany, one-fifth at France, and one-seventh at Italy.6 Civilian deaths in Germany 
from Allied bombing were estimated at over 600,000 in the post-war decades. Even the 
more recent estimate of 380,000 remains very high.7 To these should be added 60,000 or 
more Italian dead and a minimum of 57,000 for France8, plus several thousands for 
smaller countries including Belgium, the Netherlands, Austria and Bulgaria. Bomber 
Command dropped 53 per cent of the ordnance sent to Germany (against 47 per cent over 
Europe as a whole), and sought, through ‘area’ bombing, to destroy whole cities, not the 
precision targets aimed at, in theory, by the US Army Air Forces. Firestorms caused by 
                                                 
5  Martin Middlebrook and Chris Everitt, The Bomber Command War Diaries, 1939–1945 (Leicester: Midland 
Publishing, 2000 (1st edn. London, Viking, 1985)), p. 708, 711. 
6  Figures from United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Volume 2A: Statistical Appendix to Over-All Report 
(European War), Chart 1, http://www.wwiiarchives.net/servlet/action/document/page/113/12/0 (accessed 16 
November 2015). The total of 2,770,540 US tons converts to 2,513,770 metric. 
7  Dietmar Süss, Death from the Skies: How the British and Germans Survived Bombing in World War II (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 6. 
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Bomber Command’s incendiaries killed over 34,000 civilians in Hamburg in July 1943, 
5,600 in Kassel in October 1943, at least 7,500 in Darmstadt in September 1944, 25,000 
in Dresden and 17,600 in Pforzheim in February 1945 and 4,000-5,000 in Würzburg in 
March 1945: nearly 100,000 dead for the half-dozen deadliest raids.9  
 
Bomber Command’s part in the offensive therefore involved exceptionally courageous 
young men burning to death thousands of civilian men, women and children. The first 
half of the equation is perfectly compatible with Britain’s master narrative of World War 
2, the second emphatically not. The confusion was aggravated by the government’s 
failure at the time to tell the public that civilians were being deliberately targeted. Air 
Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Harris, Commander-in-Chief of Bomber Command from 23 
February 1942, sought a strong public statement of the objectives he had been invited to 
achieve: ‘the destruction of German cities, the killing of German workers and the 
disruption of civilized community life throughout Germany.’10 The Air Ministry, 
preferring to avoid controversy, refused.  
 
The British media, quietly complicit with government, took the same line. However, 
fulsome press and radio coverage left the public in no doubt that there was a policy of 
‘area bombing’ – attacking whole cities – and that it was causing, in the enthusiastic 
                                                                                                                                                 
8  Claudia Baldoli and Andrew Knapp, Forgotten Blitzes: France and Germany under Allied Air Attack (London: 
Continuum, 2012), p. 3, 261-2. 
9  Cf. Middlebrook and Everitt, Bomber Command War Diaries, p. 413-4, 440, 580-1, 669, 682; Max Hastings, , 
Bomber Command (London: Michael Joseph, 1979), p. 325; Sönke Neitzel, ‘The City Under Attack’, in Paul 
Addison and Jeremy A. Crang (eds.), Firestorm: the Bombing of Dresden, 1945 (London: Pimlico, 2006), p. 66-
77; p. 75. 
10  The National Archives of the United Kingdom, Kew (henceforth TNA): AIR2/7852; Harris to Under-Secretary of 
State, Air Ministry, 25 October 1943. Extracts from this exchange may be found in Tami Davis Biddle, Rhetoric 
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words of RAF spokesman and BBC commentator John Strachey, ‘destruction such as we 
in Britain never knew’. The death toll, though seldom estimated accurately, was never 
minimised. Yet the British public were also told that the Allied offensive was not only 
vastly more powerful than the German Blitz on Britain but vastly more moral, and that 
while the Luftwaffe sought to terrorise and kill civilians, the RAF did not.11 The 
ambiguities involved have cast a long shadow, as Harris predicted when he warned that 
the Ministry’s refusal to acknowledge the true policy ‘will inevitably lead to deplorable 
controversies when the facts are fully and generally known’.12 
 
The development of British memories of the bombing offensive since 1945 can be set 
roughly into three periods: relative quietism from the war until the early 1960s; two 
decades of scepticism from then until the early 1980s; and, since then, the slow growth of 
acceptance and memorialisation. However, these divisions are approximate and ragged, 
and, because memory operates at so many different levels, they are far from uniform.  
 
At the extremes: the state, comics, and kits 
 
Perhaps the starkest contrast appears at the extremes of the levels of memory that we have 
identified. At the summits of the state, the bombing campaign has been close to an 
                                                                                                                                                 
and Reality in Air Warfare: The Evolution of British and American Ideas about Strategic Bombing, 1914–1945 
(Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2002), pp. 219-221. 
11  For a fuller discussion of press and radio coverage in the war, cf. Andrew Knapp, ‘The Allied Bombing 
Offensive in the British Media, 1942–45’, in Andrew Knapp and Hilary Footitt (eds.), Liberal Democracies at 
War: Conflict and Representation (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), pp. 39-65. 
12  The National Archives of the United Kingdom, Kew (TNA) AIR 2/7852, Harris to Under-Secretary of State, Air 
Ministry, 23 December 1943. 
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embarrassment. For British boys growing up in the 1960s and 1970s, by contrast, it was 
celebrated in the new consumer products developed for the children’s market. 
 
‘Most people’, observed Noble Frankland, one of the two official historians of the 
bombing campaign ‘were very pleased with Bomber Command during the war and until it 
was virtually won; then they turned around and said it wasn’t a very nice way to wage 
war.’13 His remarks apply perfectly to the British government. As early as 28 March 1945, 
Prime Minister Winston Churchill, in a note to the British Chiefs of Staff, attempted to 
disown the bombing policy he had hitherto backed and in particular the attack on Dresden 
six weeks earlier. Bomber Command was largely left out of celebrations of Victory in 
Europe; no specific Bomber Command medal was issued; Harris received no peerage or 
other honour from the Labour government elected on 26 July 1945.14 Harris’s own 
Despatch on War Operations was subjected to corrections by the Air Ministry, filed, and 
closed to the public for half a century.15 The official British Bombing Survey completed 
in 1946, an altogether less ambitious project than its vast American counterpart, 
concluded that the British area attacks on German cities had been ‘undoubtedly 
overdone’; it too was left unpublished for half a century.16 The government did, it is true, 
authorise the publication of a big official history of the campaign, discussed in more 
                                                 
13  Noble Frankland, ‘Some Thoughts about and Experience of Official Military History’, Journal of the Royal Air 
Force Historical Society, 17, 1997, 20.  
14  Hastings, Bomber Command, p. 343-4; Henry Probert, Bomber Harris. His Life and Times (London, Greenhill 
Books, 2001), p. 344-5, 361-2. Harris was, however, promoted to the rank of Marshal of the Royal Air Force, the 
highest in the RAF. 
15  Sir Arthur Harris, Despatch on War Operations, 23rd February, 1942 to 8th May, 1945 (London, Frank Cass, 
1995). 
16  Sebastian Cox, (ed.), British Bombing Survey Unit, The Strategic Air War Against Germany, 1939-1945. The 
Official Report of the British Bombing Survey Unit (London: Frank Cass, 1998), p.166. 
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detail below, in 1961; but it offered little comfort to those who wanted the bombing 
campaign rehabilitated.17  
 
Official distance from the offensive is also reflected in policies of memorialisation. Battle 
of Britain Day, on 15 September, celebrates Fighter Command’s achievement in blocking 
the Luftwaffe’s offensive against the RAF; there is no Bomber Command equivalent. 
Public money financed neither the statue of Harris, unveiled in 1992, nor the Bomber 
Command memorial opened in Green Park, London twenty years later. Official reluctance 
to celebrate the bombing offensive may be explained by the distaste referred to by 
Frankland, and by the perceived need for good relations with the Federal Republic of 
Germany within the context of the Cold War and, from 1961, of Britain’s rapprochement 
with Europe. Hostile reactions in Cologne and other German cities to the unveiling of the 
Harris statue18 suggested that despite the involvement of the Royal Family in the opening 
ceremonies, governments had every reason to keep them at arm’s length. 
 
‘Forgetting’, the title of the final chapter of Patrick Bishop’s popular history Bomber 
Boys, therefore appears accurate in relation to government.19 Not so in the culture of 
schoolboys. They were treated, in the comics of the postwar generation and in the cheap 
and accurate plastic kits on sale from the 1950s, to a continuous celebration of World 
War 2 in which the bombing war played a prominent part. 
 
                                                 
17  Noble Frankland, History at War. The Campaigns of an Historian (London: Gilles de la Mare, 1998), p. 106-
113. 
18  Cf. Probert, Bomber Harris, p. 417. 
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The British comic enjoyed a golden age in the 1950s, offering some 32 pages of strip 
cartoons to weekly readers. Some comics were humorous, others devoted to adventure 
and war. Longer war stories dominated the various twice-monthly, smaller-format series 
such as Thomson’s Commando comics or Fleetway’s Air Ace picture library. Some 
weeklies reached audiences of 2 million; Commando, which still appears, managed 
750,000 annually in the 1970s.20 One of the most successful weeklies, and the most 
dominated by World War 2 stories, was the Victor, which ran from 1961 till until 1992.21 
A speciality of the Victor was the two-page ‘true story of men at war’ on the front and 
back covers, frequently ending with a heroic death, for example of Flying Officers 
Mansell over Cologne in May 1942 or Lamy after the Free French raid on Chevilly-Larue 
in October 1943.22 The Victor also carried a long-running fictional series featuring ‘the 
greatest pilot of World War 2’, the bomber veteran Matt Braddock. ‘Memory’ in the 
comics is inevitably distorted. All raids target precise objectives, not whole cities. Every 
crew appears able and willing to fly a Lancaster into flak at 1,000 feet. Braddock and the 
other fictional flyers are aces who break rules and challenge authority; being grounded for 
indiscipline appears as great a danger as being shot down. And German civilians are 
invisible (as, it is true, they were to the aircrews).23 
 
From reading the Victor, war-minded boys could turn to models of the aircraft. The first 
Airfix kit aeroplane – unsurprisingly, a Spitfire – appeared in 1953; it would be followed, 
                                                                                                                                                 
19  Patrick Bishop, Bomber Boys. Fighting Back, 1940-1945 (London: HarperPress, 2007), p. 366-389. 
20  Adam Riches, with Tim Parker and Robert Frankland, When the Comics Went to War. Comic Book War Heroes 
(Edinburgh: Mainstream Publishing, 2009), p.10; The Independent 11 November 2011. 
21  Riches, When the Comics, p. 10, 128, 154, 220. 
22  The Victor, 59, 7 April 1962; 1309, 22 March 1986.  
23  Michael Paris, Warrior Nation. Images of War in British Popular Culture, 1850-2000 (London: Reaktion Books, 
2000), p. 234-5. 
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by the 1960s, by the full range of British and American medium and heavy bombers.24 
Airfix kits could be bought for pocket-money and at least the smaller ones could be 
assembled by a 7-year-old; young teenagers could graduate to carefully-painted, realistic 
models. And the tactile contact that a kit offered enhanced the fascination of the 
Lancasters and Fortresses, which – although obsolete by 1945 – were central to the 
attraction of flying stories for boys. 
 
However much British governments might prefer to forget Bomber Command, then, a 
generation of post-war boys was invited to celebrate an idealised version of its 
achievements on paper and in plastic. Although competition from electronic 
entertainment had closed down most weekly comics by 2000 and damaged Airfix sales, 
both still appeal to a nostalgic older audience. The Commando picture library has 
survived, with two-thirds of its readers aged over 15.25 The Victor brought out a 50th 
anniversary commemorative volume in 2010, including six Braddock stories and an 
introduction by famous special forces veteran Andy McNab.26 The Airfix catalogue, 
meanwhile, offers a choice of five different Lancaster kits, including a Bomber Command 
set sold in aid of the Royal Air Force Benevolent Fund.27  
 
Bomber Command and the Historians 
 
                                                 
24  Mark Connelly, We Can Take It! Britain and the Memory of the Second World War (Harlow: Pearson Longman, 
2004), p. 240; Paris, Warrior Nation, p. 235-6. 
25  The Independent, 11 November 2011: http://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/books/news/50-years-of-
war-adaptable-commando-comic-still-going-strong-2335027.html, accessed 19 November 2015. 
26  Morris Heggie (ed.), The Best of the Victor. 50th Anniversary Edition (London: Prion, 2010). Andy McNab, 
Intorduction, p.4. 
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Between the two extremes of government and boys’ culture lie a significant academic 
historiography, popular history in the form of books, films and documentaries; and the 
outputs of actors in civil society, including churches, groups linked to the RAF and to 
veterans, and the right-wing press. 
 
The historical studies were rapidly marked by two opposed viewpoints. The first, 
sceptical, analysis came in the 1946 Report of the British Bombing Survey Unit. Though 
not published until 1998, the BBSU’s report was influential both because many of its 
findings appeared to be confirmed by those of the United States Strategic Bombing 
Survey (USSBS), and because significant parts of it were ‘carried forward into the work 
of the British Official History of the offensive’28, published in 1961. The report was clear 
that the British area offensive had failed both to break German morale and to stem the rise 
in arms production.29 Rather, bombing had hastened victory chiefly by wrecking 
Germany’s rail and waterway transport late in the war.30 The area offensive, which the 
BBSU largely wrote off, was British, the transport attacks chiefly American. But the 
report also underestimated the importance of oil, a second crucial American target set in 
1944-5. Skewed though it was, the BBSU also established findings that would serve later 
generations of historians. It suggested that bombing had cost a modest 7 per cent of the 
total British war effort, rising to 12 per cent in 1943-4. It stressed the importance for the 
combined offensive of the arrival of long-range fighter escorts in early 1944 and noted, 
                                                                                                                                                 
27  http://www.airfix.com/uk-en/catalogsearch/result/?q=lancaster, accessed 19 November 2015. 
28  Sebastian Cox, ‘The Overall Report in Retrospect’, in BBSU, The Strategic Air War, p. xxxix. 
29  BBSU, The Strategic Air War, p. 79. 
30  Cox, ‘The Overall Report in Retrospect’, p. xxiii. 
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though with little detail, that the diversion of resources away from battlefronts to the 
defence of the Reich was a significant result of the offensive.31  
 
Harris, unsurprisingly, took the opposite view, both in his Despatch on War Operations, 
published only in 1995, and in his memoirs.32 While Harris ascribes many achievements 
to Bomber Command33, the heart of his Bomber Offensive is a robust defence of area 
bombing. Industrial cities, he wrote, were attacked because that was where Germany’s 
main industries were; the effectiveness of the offensive was measurable in terms of the 
tonnage of bombs dropped and the urban area destroyed; if the bombing offensive had not 
delivered on the promises that he had made for it, it was through lack of resources and the 
lack of ‘faith in strategic bombing’ of the Allied war leaders. The Americans, Harris 
suggested, had wasted their time on precision bombing; when they finally saw the 
benefits of area attacks, in 1945, they defeated Japan without a costly land campaign.34  
 
Bomber Offensive remains more polemical than reliable. Harris’s dismissal of the idea 
that bombing could have wrecked German morale sat ill with his wartime claims to be 
able to ‘push Germany over’ from the air.35 His claim that the area bombing policy was 
decided at the highest political level, and implemented by him,36 was disingenuous. 
Harris not only executed the policy but advocated it relentlessly against growing 
opposition within the Air Staff, until Churchill disowned it in March 1945. 
                                                 
31  BBSU, The Strategic Air War, p. 69. 
32  Sir Arthur Harris, Bomber Offensive, (London: Greenhill Books, 1990: 1st edn. London: Collins 1947)). 
33  Ibid., p. 265-7. 
34  Ibid., p. 259-264. 
35  Ibid., p. 78; Hastings, Bomber Command, p. 259., 
36  Harris, Bomber Offensive, p.89. 
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By 1961 the British had not one, but two official histories. Neither was as critical as the 
BBSU report; neither was as supportive as Harris. The first, the three-volume Royal Air 
Force 1939-1945 by the novelist Hilary St George Saunders and the historian Denis 
Richards, appeared in 1953-4 and covered the RAF in both European and Pacific theatres. 
The assessment of the bombing offensive, though not quite in the Harris mould (it does 
not claim that bombing could have won the war alone; it concedes the limitations of the 
area offensive; it considers the death and destruction wreaked on ordinary Germans)37, is 
nevertheless highly favourable. Richards and Saunders introduce many themes common 
to later accounts, including the need to do something to attack the German heartland in 
1940-42, the early numerical and technological inadequacy of Bomber Command and the 
remedies that were progressively applied (Gee, and later Oboe and H2S – from 1942), 
and the contribution to final victory through the diversion of German military resources to 
the West and to defence rather than attack, the defeat of the Luftwaffe in German skies, 
and the disabling of the transport network and oil industry.38  
 
The larger official history, by the diplomatic historian Sir Charles Webster and the 
younger air power historian, Noble Frankland was entirely devoted to the bombing 
offensive.39 The authors successfully insisted, against resistance from the RAF 
establishment, on full authorial independence as well as access to closed sources.  
 
                                                 
37  Denis Richards and Hilary St George Saunders, The Royal Air Force 1939–45, vol. III, The Fight is Won, 
(London: HMSO, 1975 (1st edn. 1954)), pp. 10, 270. 
38  Ibid., pp. 381-391. 
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One of their main innovations was to document the fact that ‘the strategy of the bombing 
offensive was normally a controversial issue’ – and that it was political.40 Thus, for 
example, they show that the attacks of spring 1942 were as much about securing good 
publicity that would justify Bomber Command’s existence as about damaging the German 
war effort.41 They detail the decision to bomb Dresden, and Churchill’s disingenuous 
distancing of himself from the bombing offensive in March 1945.42 Most strikingly, they 
set out Harris’s dogged adherence to the area offensive even when enjoined from late 
1944, by formal directives and by Chief of the Air Staff Sir Charles Portal, to pursue 
precision oil and transportation targets.43 The account of these exchanges and Harris’s 
near-resignation led Portal, and the Air Ministry, to seek to censor the official history or 
even to block publication.44  
 
Focusing chiefly on Bomber Command, the Official History incorporates the USAAF 
offensive, and the American preference for precision day bombing. In that context, 
Webster and Frankland identify a turning-point at the spring of 1944, when American air 
forces won (partial) air superiority over Germany thanks to long-range fighter escorts 
with disposable extra fuel tanks. Before that, they argued, the Luftwaffe’s command of 
German skies prevented the Allied air offensive from meeting, or even approaching, its 
strategic objectives. Bomber Command could penetrate the German defences with losses 
that were just sustainable, but at night, and at the cost of accuracy. The US Eighth Air 
Force could in theory achieve selective precision bombing, but could not reach its targets 
                                                                                                                                                 
39  Sir Charles Webster and Noble Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany, 1939–1945, 4 vols. 
(London: HMSO, 1961).  
40  Webster and Frankland, Strategic Air Offensive, vol. III, p. 290. My italics. 
41  Ibid., p. 298.  
42  Ibid., p.103, 117. 
43  Ibid., p. 306. 
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without incurring unacceptable losses. As long as this lasted, ‘it scarcely mattered 
whether the bombing policy was general [as Harris preferred] or selective [in line with 
American preferences].’45 And despite spectacular local successes, as at Hamburg, the 
Allies inflicted no serious damage to the German economy. Only when the long-range 
fighters achieved air superiority could the offensive proceed with some success.46 Thus, 
wrote Frankland later, ‘If the war had ended in March 1944 for reasons other than a 
collapse of German civil morale, the Bomber Command offensive would have had to be 
described as almost a complete failure.’47 Afterwards, by contrast, the offensive 
contributed ‘a very great deal’ to the German defeat.48 Nevertheless, argued Frankland, it 
could have contributed much more, and perhaps ended the war in 1944, if the effort had 
not been needlessly dispersed between oil targets, transportation, and Harris’s area 
offensive.49 
 
Detailed and conceptually sophisticated, the official history remains an indispensable 
reference. The reviews in 1961, however, largely ignored its subtleties; indeed, the right-
wing press berated Frankland (Webster had recently died) for labelling the bomber 
offensive a ‘costly failure’, which he had not. Later, as Frankland observed in 1993, it 
was viewed quite differently, as a ‘whitewash of Sir Arthur Harris and Bomber 
Command’.50 But for the moment, however incorrectly, the Official History was placed 
                                                                                                                                                 
44  Frankland, History at War, p. 108-9. 
45  Webster and Frankland, Strategic Air Offensive, vol. III, p. 294. 
46  Webster and Frankland, Strategic Air Offensive, vol. III, p. 40, 291-4. 
47  Frankland, History at War, p. 67. 
48  Noble Frankland, ‘Overview of the Campaign’, in Royal Air Force Historical Society, Reaping the Whirlwind. 
Bracknell Paper no. 4. A Symposium on the Strategic Bomber Offensive, 1939-45, 1993, pp. 3-8: p. 5: 
http://www.rafmuseum.org.uk/documents/Research/RAF-Historical-Society-Journals/Bracknell-No-4-The-
Bomber-Offensive.pdf, accessed 20 November 2015 
49  Frankland, History at War, p. 70. 
50  Frankland, ‘Overview of the Campaign’, p.8. 
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with the BBSU report in the broadly sceptical analytical camp and the views ascribed to it 
permeated other works. Thus for the leading military historian Basil Liddell Hart, writing 
in his History of the Second World War: ‘The British pursued area-bombing long after 
they had any reason, or excuse, for such indiscriminate action’ but ‘despite the errors in 
strategy and disregard for basic morality, the bombing campaign unquestionably played a 
vital part in the defeat of Hitler’s Germany.’51  
 
The sceptical view did not, however, extend to the more ‘popular’ histories that appeared 
from the 1970s. These covered individual raids and drew substantially on interviews with 
survivors, chiefly from the RAF but also from the Luftwaffe and the civilian population. 
Martin Middlebrook’s accounts of the disastrous Nuremberg raid of 30-31 March 1944, 
and later of the bombing of Hamburg and Berlin, as well as the American raids on 
Schweinfurt and Regensburg combine meticulous narratives with numerous survivor 
statements.52 Their conclusions, despite the horrors they depict, show few doubts about 
the justification for the offensive. But perhaps Middlebrook’s major contribution to the 
history of the bombing war is his reference work Bomber Command War Diaries, a 
single-volume guide to all Bomber Command operations of any substance.53 
 
The first general history to integrate witness statements was Max Hastings’s Bomber 
Command (1979). Within a condensed strategic history of Bomber Command, Hastings 
                                                 
51  Basil Liddell Hart, History of the Second World War (London: Cassell, 1970), p. 612. 
52  Martin Middlebrook, The Nuremberg Raid, 30-31 March 1944 (London: Penguin, 1986 (1st edn. 1973)0; The 
Battle of Hamburg. The Firestorm Raid (London: Cassell, 2000 (1st edn. Allen Lane, 1980)); The Schweinfurt-
Regensburg Mission: American Raids on 17 August 1943 (London: Cassell, 2000 (1st edn. Allen Lane, 1983)) 
The Berlin Raids. The Bomber Command Winter, 1943-44 (London: Cassell, 2000 (1st edn. Allen Lane, 1988).  
53  Cf. Middlebrook and Everitt, Bomber Command War Diaries. 
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includes chapters on four RAF stations at specific moments of the war, on Harris’s 
underground headquarters at High Wycombe, and, from the German viewpoint, on the 
firestorm raid on Darmstadt. He also introduces new themes such as the wartime protests 
against the offensive voiced by such figures as Bishop Bell of Chichester or Richard 
Stokes MP, and so-called ‘Lack of Moral Fibre’ – the cases of airmen unable to bear the 
strain of operations. Though drawing on Webster and Frankland, Hastings is much more 
severe than the official historians. The Americans had made the main contributions by 
defeating the Luftwaffe, and by wrecking Germany’s oil industry. Area bombing had been 
a failure, and Harris should have been sacked for sticking to it. The destruction of cities 
like Darmstadt punished German civilians for their leaders’ crimes but contributed 
nothing to victory. And thus ‘the cost of the bomber offensive in life, treasure, and moral 
superiority over the enemy tragically outstripped the results that it achieved.’54 Readable, 
much-reprinted, and imbued with moral passion, Bomber Command helped entrench 
sceptical views of the value of the offensive. 
 
Central to the sceptical view was the fact that Germany’s war industries grew fast, despite 
bombing, well into 1944. By the 1980s, however, this growth was being placed in new 
contexts. For Richard Overy, whose first book on the subject appeared in 1980, the 
achievements of bombing should be measured not against actual German production but 
against what had been planned for a war expected to start in 1942.55 Thus although 
productivity in the arms industry doubled between 1941 and 1944, bombing ‘placed a 
ceiling’ on further improvement. It made the supply of components slower and less 
predictable, obliging firms to hold bigger stocks; it forced the dispersal of industry into 
                                                 
54  Hastings, Bomber Command, p. 350-2. 
 Knapp: Bomber Command 17 
smaller, less well-located plants. Thus in January 1945 the German Armaments Ministry 
estimated that German industry produced ‘35 per cent fewer tanks, 31 per cent fewer 
aircraft, and 42 per cent fewer lorries’ than it would have done without bombing. All the 
German officials interviewed by post-war Allied researchers ascribed the economic 
collapse from January 1945 to bombing.56 For Adam Tooze, indeed, Bomber Command 
had damaged German production as early as spring 1943, when raids on the Ruhr halted 
the ‘armaments miracle’ attempted by Hitler’s Armaments Minister Albert Speer; 
Harris’s error lay in then diverting this effort to a fruitless assault on Berlin.57 Moreover, 
as Overy points out, a growing proportion of war production went to anti-aircraft 
defences: 30 per cent of guns, 20 per cent of heavy ammunition, 50 per cent of electro-
technical production, a third of production of the optical industry.58 Even the attack on 
German morale, suggests Overy, was not a complete failure. Absenteeism in the Reich 
reached 23.5 days in 1944, and rose as high as 25 per cent in some factories such as Ford 
at Cologne.59 In the areas of worker productivity, the transfers of defences to the Reich, 
and the diversion of production to anti-aircraft defences, British area bombing might be 
seen as just as useful as precision bombing. Indeed, Sebastian Cox has argued that it was 
the dispersal forced in 1942-3, mostly by area bombing, that made German production 
more dependent on transport links, multiplying the impact of attacks on the German 
transport system in 1944-45.60  
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Set against what Mark Connelly called the ‘orthodoxy’ of the post-war surveys and of 
‘yet another government statement, the Official History’61 such analyses amounted to a 
partial rehabilitation. As well as the economic gains, bombing had produced political 
dividends, sustaining morale at home and offering Stalin a ‘second front’, of sorts, from 
1942. These upbeat views were also expounded in the more ‘popular’ histories by Denis 
Richards or Robin Neillands.62  
 
The rehabilitation itself has not gone unchallenged. In 1991 David Edgerton called 
strategic bombing ‘a massive misallocation of resources’63 and later queried the detail of 
the diversion of military effort to Germany’s home defence.64 More remarkable, perhaps, 
is the renewed note of scepticism in Overy’s substantial recent study.65 The Bombing 
War: Europe 1939-1945 covers campaigns excluded or marginalised in many earlier 
accounts: not only the Allied bombing of France and Italy but also Bulgaria, and the 
German bombing of the Soviet Union. It also examines the ways in which states and 
societies and the new relationships that developed between peoples and government as a 
result.66 It concludes that ‘the bombing offensives in the Second World War were all 
relative failures in their own terms.’67 Although this assessment applies to both German 
and Allied offensives, Overy is particularly severe towards British area bombing: whether 
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in its origins in inter-war colonial ‘policing’ operations, in the deliberation with which 
British researchers perfected techniques of burning down whole cities, or in the official 
lies about what was being attempted, area bombing, for Overy, was morally flawed.68 
 
Bombing and morality 
 
Most works cited hitherto question the morality of the bombing offensive.69 British area 
bombing is criticised more than American precision bombing, as less effective and more 
indiscriminate;70 and firestorm raids are understandably seen as the worst. Dresden 
occupies a distinctive place in this category, for several reasons. The raid destroyed a 
treasure-house of German baroque architecture; it occurred when the Allied victory was 
not in doubt (unlike the earlier, deadlier raid on Hamburg); and it triggered the British 
government’s withdrawal of support for the area offensive, after an unusually frank press 
briefing prompted Associated Press to state that the Allies had crossed a threshold into 
‘terror bombing’.71 The Associated Press despatch caused consternation among the 
British élite, prompting questions in the House of Commons and ultimately Churchill’s 
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disowning of the bombing campaign a month later.72 Churchill omitted Dresden from his 
memoirs.73 Harris, by contrast, mounted a predictably vigorous defence: as ‘the largest 
city in Germany […] which had been left intact’, it was as legitimate a target as anywhere 
else, and the bombing had been ‘considered a military necessity by much more important 
people than myself’.74 If nothing else had secured Harris’s status as the stage villain of the 
area bombing campaign, Dresden would have sufficed. 75  
 
After the war, Dresden’s position at the heart of memory was ensured, firstly, by a British 
pressure group, the Bombing Restriction Committee, which claimed in December 1945 
that the raid had killed between 200,000 and 300,000 people, against an already-beaten 
enemy and a target of no military significance. Of wider impact was David Irving’s 1963 
account of the bombing, from a largely German viewpoint. Irving called the raid ‘the 
biggest single massacre in European history’, put the death toll at 135,000, observed that 
it failed in its stated purpose of disrupting communications, and enlisted Harris’s own 
Deputy, Air Marshal Sir Robert Saundby, to write a forward supporting his case.76 
Irving’s reputation as a historian has deteriorated since, as he sought to compare the area 
bombing offensive to the Holocaust, juxtaposing excessive figures for the death toll at 
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Dresden (the best current estimate is 18,000-25,000)77, with gross underestimates of the 
number of Holocaust victims. But repeated reprints of Irving’s book over more than thirty 
years ensured its continuing influence, albeit more in Germany than in Britain.78  
 
More respectable historians than Irving have also attacked the morality of the area 
offensive. Hastings underlines the ‘significant moral distinction between the incidental 
and deliberate destruction of civilian life in war’, adding that ‘it is hard to look back […] 
with any pride on such a night’s work as the destruction of Darmstadt.’79 Hew Strachan 
observes that ‘in the Second World War, [Britain] flouted the norms which underpinned 
the laws of war’, Overy that the British, American and German air offensives all ‘violated 
every accepted norm in the conduct of modern warfare.’ If indiscriminate bombing was 
withdrawn from the charge sheets at Nuremberg, he adds, it was because the Allies’ legal 
vulnerability on this issue was all too clear.80 
 
The most sustained moral criticism, however, has come from a philosopher, Anthony 
Grayling. Grayling bases most of his case on just war theory: however just a war may be 
in itself, the just waging of war requires each act to be necessary and proportionate, and 
alternative, and less damaging, means towards the intended purpose to have been 
exhausted.81 If munitions workers are legitimate targets, writes Grayling, no other 
civilians are, and proportionality requires that non-combatants should not be targeted or 
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exposed to serious risk of becoming casualties.82 That no specific rules against 
indiscriminate bombing had been ratified by all parties to the Hague Conventions by 
1939, that was beside the point; the protection of civilians had been written into umbrella 
provisions of the Conventions of 1899 and 1907.83 
 
On the specifics of the Allied bombing offensive, Grayling suggests that the fact that the 
Allied victory was certain by September 1944 detracts from the legitimacy of raids 
undertaken thereafter.84 And in undertaking area rather than precision bombing, the 
British were flouting the ethical requirement that alternative means to an intended 
purpose should be exhausted.85 Area bombing, for Grayling, was ‘very wrong’: neither 
necessary, nor proportionate, nor consistent with ‘the general moral standards of the kind 
recognised and agreed in Western civilisation’: Hamburg (and Hiroshima) were no better 
than the 9/11 attacks on New York. British aircrews were brave men doing something 
wrong who should therefore have refused to obey orders.86 British governments knew that 
targeting civilians was wrong; hence their efforts to conceal their actions. And post-war 
declarations and agreements designed to protect civilians against bombing, especially the 
1949 Geneva Convention and its 1977 protocols, constitute ‘a retrospective indictment of 
the practices they outlaw.’87  
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Some of Grayling’s specific points are readily countered. The claim that from September 
1944 the conflict was nearly ‘over’ ignores the fact that only the Allies’ vigorous 
prosecution of it secured Germany’s defeat. Grayling also exaggerates the effective 
precision of precision bombing: several American raids on France, carried out in clear 
skies against weak air defences, killed over 1,000 French civilians; the record of blind 
bombing through the cloud cover of the Ruhr was worse.88 But most defenders of the area 
offensive base their arguments on the exceptionally odious character of the enemy being 
and the specific predicament of the British in 1940. Thus for Frankland, ‘The great 
immorality open to us in 1940 and 1941 was to lose the war against Hitler’s Germany. To 
have abandoned the only weapon of direct attack which we had at our disposal would 
have been a long step in that direction.’89 Given the technology available, area bombing 
was ‘Bomber Command’s last and only resort’90, the only alternative to no bombing at 
all. The Germans, moreover, had ‘started it’: ‘Cities all over Europe had been attacked by 
the Luftwaffe and we were merely returning the medicine.’91 ‘Morality’, said a bomber 
pilot quoted by Overy, ‘is a thing you can indulge in in an environment of peace and 
security, but you can’t make moral judgements in war, when it’s a question of national 
survival.’92 And in the context of reverses in North Africa and in the Atlantic in 1941-2 
bombing was the only thing resembling a success story that the British could claim.93 For 
the ace bomber pilot Leonard Cheshire, finally, the bombing offensive was justified by 
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the fact that ‘Every day the war lasted, another ten thousand were exterminated in the 
concentration camps’ – and thus that it had to be shortened by any means available.94  
 
Many commentators link morality to effectiveness: Stephen Garrett, for example, 
condemns the area offensive as ‘both a crime and a mistake.’95 Hastings takes a similar 
view, in more measured terms. But the link is not absolute. Frankland has defended the 
morality of the offensive while dismissing its effectiveness before March 1944. Overy, by 
contrast, some of whose assessments of the effects have been more positive, nevertheless 
joined Grayling in 2012 to debate in favour of a motion that ‘The Allied bombing of 
German cities in World War II was unjustifiable’, arguing that resources could have been 
better used to develop fast light bombers capable of precision attacks. The supporters of 
the offensive, the military historians Patrick Bishop and Antony Beevor, won, with 191 
votes against the motion and 115 in favour. This result suggests that no consensus on the 
subject exists. But the two sides’ views were not wholly opposed: Grayling believed that 
bombing made a major contribution to the liberation of France, while both Bishop and 
Beevor condemned the pursuit of area bombing after late 1944. 96 
 
Some airmen had doubts about the morality of bombing, both at the time and 
retrospectively. Pilot Robert Wannop, bombing Saarbrucken, observed himself, ‘a young 
man with a wife and a beautiful baby daughter, raining death and unbearable horror on 
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similar wives and children. Yet the worst part of it was that I felt no guilt, no sense of 
repulsion at the enormity of my deed. […] God! What monsters we had become!’97 One 
of Hastings’s interviewees talked of his nightmares: he had ‘changed his job and started 
to teach mentally-handicapped children, which he saw as a kind of restitution.’98 But 
historians have found many more former aircrew aggrieved at their treatment by the 
government, the public and, especially, the media. Thus one felt ‘disgust and dismay’ at 
the newspapers’ ‘grovelling and sanctimonious apologia [sic] for the bombing of German 
cities’ on the fortieth anniversary of VE-Day. Another felt ‘bitter’ that ‘none of the 
politicians wanted to take responsibility’ for the offensive, allowing the memory of the 
Bomber Command dead to be ‘tarnished’ A third expressed loyalty to Harris: ‘the 
fondness for him grew when the criticism of him started. We weren’t just protecting 
Butch, we were protecting our own reputations.’ Finally, Miles Tripp, who had looked 
down at Dresden burning and then made sure that his bombs fell in open country, offered 
a detached, if disabused, view of public opinion: ‘when one’s survival is threatened, one 
is grateful to those who offer protection. Once the danger is past, one is ashamed that 
one’s intellectual theories have been so easily overruled by a primitive instinct or 
emotion, and that the erstwhile helpers are an immediate target for the hostility caused by 
this sense of shame.’99 The last part of this paper considers how far the wider culture has 
reflected the historians’ debates and justified the aircrews’ sense of rejection. 
 
‘Black sheep’ or ‘Forgotten Heroes’? Bomber Command in the wider culture 
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Mark Connelly has called Harris and Bomber Command ‘the black sheep of the British 
popular memory of the Second World War’, their offensive a ‘missing chapter in the 
public memory of the Second World War.’ John Nichol and Tony Rennell refer to 
bomber crews as ‘Forgotten Heroes’.100 Such assessments appear odd, and not only 
because of the boys’ culture considered earlier: Connelly himself has counted some 570 
books on Bomber Command published to the mid-1990s.101 The output has certainly not 
diminished since; other cultural products have complemented books; and actors in civil 
society have promoted the memorialisation of the bombing war, culminating in the 
unveiling of an imposing, even overbearing monument to Bomber Command in 2012. 
 
Positive, mass-audience narratives of Bomber Command have a long pedigree: Paul 
Brickhill’s The Dam Busters, a biography of the elite 617 squadron, has been in print 
since publication in 1951.102 The recent material already cited is the tip of a larger 
iceberg.103 It is heavily based on the statements of bomber crews: able young men with 
lives to make in the post-war world, and little time to reminisce, but in their later years, 
far more inclined to tell their stories. Alongside the profusion of general histories, Harris 
now has a well-researched biography, sympathetic but not hagiographic104, 617 
squadron’s 1943 raid on the Ruhr dams has its first new account in 60 years105, and 
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Daniel Swift has written a haunting evocation of bombing bases in the flat landscapes of 
East Anglia, of literary representations of the bombing war, and of his search for his 
grandfather’s grave in Holland.106 Many readers of these books, it may be surmised, grew 
up in the 1960s and 1970s with the Victor and plastic kits. 
 
Film and television have complemented the multiplication of written accounts, despite the 
obvious difficulties of massing Lancaster bombers for the screen. The film of The Dam 
Busters, blessed with an instantly memorable theme tune, topped the British box-office in 
1955 and was no. 68 in the British Film Institute’s 1999 list of 100 best British films.107 
Some cinemas showing The Dam Busters in 1954-5 organised collections for the RAF 
Benevolent Fund or even opened RAF recruiting offices.108 But The Dam Busters, much 
in the manner of the Victor, portrayed a single very high-precision raid by the Command’s 
elite squadron, not the nightly despatch of massed formations to the Ruhr or Berlin. It 
inspired one imitation in 633 Squadron, a fictional account of a daring raid by a squadron 
flying twin-engined Mosquitoes, which reflected commonly-experienced realities even 
less. Pathfinders, a twelve-episode ITV television series of the early 1970s, did better in 
principle: based on survivors’ accounts, it followed a ‘Pathfinder’ squadron, charged with 
marking targets as raids started. But neither the scripts nor the acting caught the public 
imagination as The Dam Busters had. More successful was the BBC’s Harris (1989), 
which narrated the bomber offensive through a dramatised biography of the Commander-
in-Chief. Played by the very popular actor John Thaw, Harris got a sympathetic hearing, 
but the biopic did not shrink from presenting the offensive’s grim realities. 
                                                 
106  Daniel Swift, Bomber County. The Lost Airmen of World War Two (London: Penguin, 2011 (1st edn. London: 
Hamish Hamilton, 2010). 
107  See http://www.cinemarealm.com/best-of-cinema/top-100-british-films/, accessed 24 November 2015. 
108  Paris, Warrior Nation, p. 226; Süss, Death from the Skies, p. 466-7. 
 Knapp: Bomber Command 28 
 
The fictionalised accounts have been matched by documentaries. Thames Television’s 
1973-4 series The World at War devoted the twelfth of its 26 episodes to strategic 
bombing and featured original footage and interviews with British, American and German 
aircrew, with German civilian survivors, and with senior strategists on all sides including 
Harris and Speer. But Episode 12 ends at April 1944, a point at which the offensive 
appeared as largely unsuccessful. As the only coverage in subsequent episodes was of 
Dresden, the overall balance of The World at War was decidedly negative. However, later 
documentaries, including Channel 4’s Reaping the Whirlwind (1997), have been much 
more upbeat. Some recent productions have used well-known actors as presenters, and 
attempted to re-create aspects of operations, emphasising their difficulty. Thus the veteran 
television actor Martin Shaw, in Dambusters Declassified (2010), ‘retraces’ 617 
Squadron’s dams raid journey; the documentary also includes an interview with the 
former mistress of the operation’s leader, Wing Commander Guy Gibson. In Bomber 
Boys (2012), the film star Ewan McGregor enlists his brother, an RAF pilot, to learn to 
fly a Lancaster: a brief history of Bomber Command is interwoven with Colin 
McGregor’s training sessions. While German survivors of the Hamburg raids are 
interviewed for the programme, the climax, inevitably, is when the McGregors finally 
take to the air with the blessing of survivors of 617 squadron. Commercially successful, 
the formula inevitably runs the risk of trivialising its subject. Altogether more thoughtful, 
and more sensitive to the moral dilemmas of the crews, is Steven Hatton’s Into the Wind 
(2012); but it was shown to the smaller audiences of the Yesterday channel. 
 
If there was some substance in the 1970s to portrayals of bomber crews as ‘forgotten 
heroes’ or ‘black sheep’, such claims had little justification by the early twenty-first 
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century. It is tempting to draw a comparison with the memories of German victims. As 
survivors of Germany’s wartime generation neared the end of their natural lives, works 
such as Jörg Friedrich’s The Fire (2003) claimed that the bombing offensive had been a 
‘taboo’ subject in Germany – although, as Dietmar Süss has shown, the ‘taboo’, at least at 
local and regional level, is largely imaginary.109  
 
The memory of the bombing war is also heavily sustained by a variety of actors within 
civil society. One is the RAF itself, whose public visibility has greatly increased since the 
1982 Falklands War. Here, for the first time since the largely unreported late colonial 
conflicts of the 1950s and 1960s, the RAF was in action in what proved to be a highly 
popular war. Its combat role has continued through two wars with Iraq, the Kosovo 
conflict of 1999, the long Afghan war, the 2012 air strikes on Libya, and, from December 
2015, over Syria. Within the UK, the visibility has been reinforced by the opening of two 
museums, at Hendon in London and Cosford in Shropshire. The Hendon museum, opened 
in 1973, unveiled a Bomber Command hall ten years later. The Battle of Britain 
Memorial Flight, stationed at 617 squadron’s former base at Coningsby in Lincolnshire, 
operates not only the Spitfires and Hurricanes of World War 2, but also the UK’s one 
Lancaster still in flying order (although the first Lancaster only flew sixteen months after 
the Battle of Britain ended).110 At the same time the RAF Historical Branch has 
developed its sponsorship of conferences and publications (of the BBSU survey, but also 
of Harris’s Despatch, and of a range of air power books).111 The memorialisation 
undertaken by the RAF itself is complemented by that of the Imperial War Museum, 
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whose director from 1960 to 1982 was Noble Frankland. The main museum’s library 
houses collections of photographs, former aircrew diaries, and papers of senior RAF 
officers. In 1976, moreover, the IWM opened an air annexe at the former RAF station at 
Duxford in Cambridgeshire, with a collection of historic aircraft and regular air 
displays.112 Bomber Command itself has held its own reunions since 1949, and in 1985 a 
Bomber Command Association was formed to ‘educate and inform the general public in 
the work and history of Bomber Command’. It claimed 6,000 members at the start of the 
new millennium.113  
 
Churches have memorialised the bombing, in highly contrasting ways that show ‘how the 
memory of the Second World War could be fragmented and regionalized.’114 Across East 
Anglia, Bomber Command aircrew who served in nearby stations are celebrated in 
stained glass windows, usually dating from the 1950s. Bombers stand next to angels in 
Ely and Lincoln cathedrals; in the church at Great Yarmouth (which suffered several 
German raids) a window bears the Bomber Command motto – ‘Strike hard, strike sure.’ 
More widely known, however, because more international, is Coventry, which represents 
the German Blitz on Britain almost as much as Dresden stands for the Allied offensive 
against Germany. The two cities are twinned, and on 13 February 2000, the first Dresden 
anniversary of the new millennium, the bishop of Coventry, preaching in Dresden’s 
Kreuzkirche, said that ‘Hitler’s war had unleashed a whirlwind into which we were all 
swept. The dynamic of war swept away our inhibitions. When the British and American 
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air forces destroyed Dresden, we had suppressed our moral principles.’115 Starting from 
Coventry in 1945, three nails from the roof of the wrecked St Michael’s Cathedral, bent 
together to form a cross, became the symbol of the cathedral’s renewal; its replication 
across other destroyed churches in Europe became the symbol of a broad commitment to 
reconciliation, reaffirmed when the new cathedral was consecrated in 1962. The 
Community of the Cross of Nails, based in the new St Michael’s cathedral, has partner 
churches in 27 countries, including 63 in Germany.116 Following German unification, the 
Dresden Trust was founded in Britain in 1993 with the initial purpose of helping to 
rebuild the Dresden Frauenkirche, which had been left in ruins under the GDR, and the 
broader one, again, of promoting and perpetuating reconciliation.117  
 
Bomber Command also, finally, has visible, public memorials. A statue of Harris was 
unveiled (amidst vocal protests) by the Queen Mother outside St Clement Danes, the 
central church of the RAF in the Strand, London, on 31 May 1992, the fiftieth anniversary 
of the thousand-bomber raid on Cologne. Altogether more ambitious was the Bomber 
Command memorial in Green Park, opened by the Queen on 28 June 2012. Despite their 
royal patronage, both monuments were financed by public subscription, amounting to £8 
million for the Green Park memorial, not government money.118 The campaign to build 
the monument, led by the Bomber Command Association, attracted backing from many 
sources: Robin Gibb, leading member of the 60s and 70s pop group the Bee Gees; 
popular historians such as Kevin Wilson and Patrick Bishop, both critics of the 
government’s failure to promote a memorial, which they ascribed to concerns about 
                                                 
115  Quoted in Alan Russell, ‘Why Dresden Matters’, in Paul Addison and Jeremy A. Crang (eds.), Firestorm: the 
Bombing of Dresden, 1945 (London: Pimlico, 2006), 161-179: p. 164. 
116  http://www.coventrycathedral.org.uk/ccn/our-partners/, accessed 25 November 2015. 
117  Russell, ‘Why Dresden Matters’, p.168-172. 
 Knapp: Bomber Command 32 
Anglo-German relations;119 the right-wing, Eurosceptic press (the Daily Telegraph and 
above all the Daily Express and the Daily Mail); and right-wing political donors such as 
Lord Ashcroft, former Deputy Chairman of the Conservative Party, who contributed £1 
million.120 Few wartime causes have been so politically marked. 
 
The overblown Green Park edifice is not alone. By the coastal path at Beachy Head, 
another, almost ostentatiously modest monument, one metre wide by two metres long, 
marks the spot where many bomber crews flying south got their last sight of Britain. And 
at Lincoln, close to the headquarters of Bomber Command’s no. 5 group, a 31-metre spire 
and a series of walls of remembrance unveiled in October 2015 form the heart of what is 
intended to be an International Bomber Command Centre. By 2015, then, too late for 
many airmen, the upsurge in memorialisation had ensured that Britain has not one 
Bomber Command memorial, but three. 
 
By way of conclusion 
 
The bombing war has remained the most contentious aspect of Britain’s World War 2 
record, but not because it was ‘forgotten’, an expression better reserved for much of the 
war in the Far East. It has been contentious above all because of the gulf between the 
exceptional courage of the young men who served in Bomber Command and the horror 
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that they inflicted on the German civilian population. To celebrate the bravery of the 
aircrew is to belittle the suffering of the civilians who died; to state clearly that the 
bombing offensive violated the laws and norms by which civilised human beings wage 
war diminishes the courage of the aircrew. The extraordinary difficulty of straddling this 
gulf explains the unease even of some of the aircrew themselves. The difficulties are 
compounded, as Süss observes, if the international context is taken into account. Germans 
seeking to promote a sense of national victimhood have seized on the Official History and 
the more sceptical British accounts. And the efforts at reconciliation coming from British 
churches run the risk of establishing a moral equivalence between the two belligerents.121 
 
At the war’s conclusion, to the shock of aircrews and their commander-in-chief, 
governments abruptly withdrew the vigorous support they had lent to Bomber 
Command’s offensive over five years. At the same time both the British and American 
post-war bombing surveys, and the later British official history, concluded that bombing 
had not been nearly as effective as its proponents had suggested, while the message of 
reconciliation articulated from Coventry, in a country where the Church’s position as a 
leader of opinion was still strong, entailed an ethical rejection of the bombing offensive. 
This, in the 1960s and 1970s, was the nearest that the United Kingdom came to a 
consensus opposed to the bombing campaign. The consensus was never universal, 
however; it did not prevent the publication of the Richards and Saunders history of the 
RAF, or the enormous popularity of the Dam Busters, both book and film, among all 
ages, and the war comics and plastic kits among children. By the 1990s, the history was 
being rewritten and the achievements of the offensive revised upwards This did not create 
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a new ethical consensus, even between historians, but it did suggest that Bomber 
Command had made a significant contribution to winning the war. Both that and the 
wider visibility of both the armed forces in general and the RAF in particular made it 
easier to celebrate the achievements of Bomber Command. Praise for the aircrew then 
rolled out across a wide range of literary and other cultural production, with the efforts of 
the Bomber Command association finding a ready reception in the broader civil society. 
The culmination of this process was the triumphant memorialisation of Bomber 
Command at Green Park. The danger is that the Bomber Command memorial has both 
mobilised and reinforced right-wing Eurosceptical forces in civil society – in particular 
the right-wing press – and that the memories of Bomber Command have been captured by 
a chauvinistic and inward-looking project. For those aircrew members who joined 
Bomber Command in order to secure, not only an Allied victory, but a Europe reconciled 
and at peace with itself, this would be a betrayal. 
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